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This paper analyzes the meltdown of the commercial paper market during the Great 
Depression, and relates those findings to the recent financial crisis. Theoretical models of 
financial frictions and information problems imply that lenders will make fewer non-
collateralized loans or investments and relatively more extensions of collateralized finance in 
times of high risk premiums.  This study investigates the relevance of such theories to the Great 
Depression by analyzing whether the increased use of a collateralized form of business lending 
(bankers acceptances) relative to that of non-collateralized commercial paper can be 
econometrically attributable to measures of corporate credit/financial risk premiums.  Because 
commercial paper and bankers acceptances are short-lived, they are more timely measures of the 
availability of short-term credit than are bank or business failures and the level or growth rate of 
the stock of bank loans, whose maturities were often longer and were renegotiable. In this way, 
the study adds to the literature on financial market frictions during the Great Depression, which 
aside from analyzing securities prices, typically investigates the behavior of credit-related 
variables that lag current conditions, such as bank failures, bankruptcies, the stock of money, or 
outstanding bank loans. 
In particular, the real level of bankers acceptances and their use relative to non-
collateralized commercial paper were strongly and positively related to spreads between 
corporate and treasury bond yields.  Also significant were short-run events, such as the October 
1929 stock market crash and the 1933 bank holiday episode that sparked flights to quality in the 
bond market and a flight to collateral (BAs) in the money market and perhaps away from the 
loan market. Furthermore, these shifts in the composition of external finance were large, 
supporting the view that financial frictions and reduced credit availability may have played an 
important role in depressing the U.S. economy during the 1930s.  
The paper also relates these findings to the current financial crisis by examining how the 
relative use of commercial paper reacted to yield spreads during the current crisis, taking into 
account Federal Reserve actions to improve liquidity conditions in the money markets.  Results 
suggest that these efforts may have, at least so far, helped prevent the commercial paper market 
from melting down to the extent seen during the early 1930s. 
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This paper analyzes the meltdown of the commercial paper market during the Great 
Depression and relates those findings to the recent financial crisis, particularly with respect to 
Federal Reserve and Treasury efforts to improve liquidity conditions in the money markets.  
Theoretical models of financial frictions imply that credit extensions will shift from risky to safer 
borrowers if economic factors increase default risk or increase the cost of loanable funds via 
increasing liquidity risk premiums (e.g., Bernanke and Blinder, 1988; Bernanke and 
Gertler,1989; Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist, 1996; Jaffee and Russell, 1976; Keeton, 1979; 
Lang and Nakamura, 1995; and Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981).  Based on these implications, post-
World War II data on the composition of business credit has been used to assess the relevance of 
such theories, dating back to at least Jaffee and Modigliani (1969), who assess the composition 
of bank business lending, and extending to recent studies, such as Kashyap, Wilcox, and Stein 
(1993), who analyze the relative use of commercial paper and bank loans.  This literature, 
especially the flight-to-quality model of Lang and Nakamura (1995) and the financial accelerator 
approach of Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1996), implies that lenders will make fewer non-
secured loans and extend relatively more collateralized finance in times of high default risk.   
Studies of the current crisis may be hampered by what some may misperceive as a lack of 
historical precedent, but the current study provides an analysis of the relative use of commercial 
paper during the Great Depression to shed light on how the money markets have been affected 
by the current crisis.  It also provides evidence that Fed/Treasury efforts may have (so far) 
prevented the commercial paper market from imploding on the scale that it did in 1932.  In 
general, empirical studies of the impact of financial frictions and monetary factors during the 
1930s have focused on examining the links between bank failures/loans and economic activity 
(Bernanke, 1983; and Calomiris and Mason, 2003), the source and impact of the fall in the 
money supply (Boughton and Wicker, 1979; Friedman and Schwartz, 1963; and Hamilton, 
1992), the role of nonmonetary factors (Temin, 1976 and 1989), the conduct of monetary policy   2
(Field, 1984; and Wheelock, 1990), the role of unanticipated deflation (Hamilton, 1987), or links 
between default risk spreads and economic growth (Bernanke, 1983). Although the credit and 
financial frictions’ literature, particularly the financial accelerator work of Bernanke and Gertler 
(1989) and Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1996), is partly motivated by the Great Depression, 
there are no published studies that empirically analyze the composition of business credit 
extensions during the era, partly reflecting a lack of data on timely measures of external finance.   
The current paper fills part of this gap by investigating whether the increased use of a 
collateralized form of business lending (bankers acceptances, BAs) relative to that of non-
collateralized commercial paper during the Great Depression (Figure 1) can be econometrically 
attributable to indicators of corporate credit risk and the risk of bank runs.  For robustness, these 
financial factors are assessed in models of the levels and first differences of real bankers 
acceptances. In addition to the default and liquidity risk premiums in corporate-Treasury yield 





















Figure 1: Domestic Bankers Acceptances Rise Relative to Commercial Paper








   3
in a crisis, banks had the option of borrowing against or selling BAs to the Federal Reserve, 
which committed itself to rediscounting BAs and commercial paper held by banks and whose 
ability to rediscount bank assets was limited to these types of paper until the Banking Act of 
1935. As a result, BAs were more liquid than other bank assets.  But the Fed’s conduct of open  
market operations in BAs and discounting BAs lowered the liquidity risk of investing in BAs..   
By implication, the relative use of BAs as a source of external finance should be increasing in (1) 
measures of corporate-Treasury risk spreads, which blend default risk and liquidity risk, and (2) 
possibly measures of the risk of bank runs, such as the currency-to-deposit ratio.  Nevertheless, 
there are reasons why higher bank run risk may not induce greater use of BAs.This paper is 
related to Bernanke’s (1983) empirical findings that two proxies for the destruction of financial 
intermediation during the Depression, deposits of suspended banks and liabilities of failing 
businesses, were significant in explaining changes in industrial production in the presence of 
money growth.  Bernanke also referenced a finding that a proxy for default risk, the spread 
between yields on Baa and Aaa-rated corporate bonds, was also statistically significant in 
accounting for industrial production, but was also highly collinear with other indicators of 
financial distress.  Although Bernanke discussed how deflation destroyed collateral and thereby 
plausibly reduced the availability of credit, the literature has not directly assessed whether the 
composition of business finance during the Great Depression was affected by rising risk 
premiums and bank run risk in ways consistent with theories of financial frictions.   
The current study tests whether an empirical implication of the credit/financial frictions’ 
channel is consistent with Bernanke’s finding that financial frictions were macro-economically 
important.  This study also uses more timely data on business finance than has been often used in 
studying the Great Depression.  Because commercial paper and bankers acceptances are short-
lived, they are more timely indicators of the availability of external finance than are bank or 
business failures and the level or growth of the stock of bank loans, which lag the economy and   4
which have been analyzed in much of the literature on the Great Depression.  A particular 
problem with analyzing outstanding bank loans is that bankers may have given troubled 
borrowers more time to repay loans or delayed writing off loans.  As a result, growth in the stock 
of bank loans may not give a consistent nor timely indication of the availability of new credit.  
Consistent with a financial frictions channel, bankers acceptances—real or relative to 
commercial paper—are increasing in the spreads between investment-grade corporate and 
Treasury bond yields.  Such spreads are used to gauge risk premiums, without breaking them 
down into expected default losses and changes in the price of default and liquidity risk.  [Temin 
(1976) argues that wider corporate quality spreads reflected heightened risk of business failures 
rather than tight liquidity conditions.]  Because the money market and corporate spread variables 
exhibit drift and nonstationarity during the Great Depression era, cointegration techniques are 
used. Given the short maturities of bankers acceptances and commercial paper, results imply that 
risk premiums persistently affected the composition and availability of external finance.   
To relate these findings to the current crisis, this study also analyzes the current crisis.  
Owing to the deepening of financial and credit markets, and the Fed’s shift toward conducting 
open market operations in Treasury and agency debt, bankers acceptances have become a trivial 
source of domestic finance.  Instead, the paper-bank loan mix (Kashyap, Wilcox, and Stein, 
1997) is modeled to see how the same Baa-Treasury spread used in the Great Depression sample 
is related to the composition of short-term business finance in the current crisis.  Results suggest 
that actions taken since October to improve liquidity in the money markets may have helped 
prevent the commercial paper market from imploding by as much as it did in the early 1930s.  
This study is organized as follows.  Section 2 provides detail about bankers acceptances 
and hypotheses about their use during the Great Depression.  Section 3 presents the data and 
section 4, the empirical results for this era.  Section 5 examines whether new Federal Reserve   5
liquidity programs may have prevented the commercial paper market from collapsing.  The 
conclusion relates the findings for the Great Depression with those on the current crisis. 
II. Details and Hypotheses Regarding Bankers Acceptances and Commercial Paper 
What Are Bankers Acceptances and What Purposes Do They Serve? 
  A bankers acceptance is a time draft drawn on a bank to finance the shipment or storage 
of goods.  A draft is “accepted” when a bank guarantees payment to the holder.  This makes the 
BA tradeable in securities markets because the issuing bank unconditionally promises payment 
to the investor at a specified date regardless of whether the goods-buying firm repays the bank 
and because investors usually have better information about the bank than the goods purchaser.  
The goods-buying firm essentially receives funding to pay the seller from a bank, which funds 
the extension by selling the bankers acceptance.  From the perspective of banks guaranteeing 
BAs, the goods purchased or held in inventory collateralize the BAs.  Thus, extending BAs 
entails less default risk than making an unsecured loan to a firm of similar credit quality. 
Why Risk Premiums May Affect The Use of Bankers Acceptances 
Theories of credit and financial frictions imply that lenders would pressure borrowers for 
more collateral, which is relevant for the BA market during an era when firms had fewer 
financing options.  Goods sellers, for instance, may be reluctant to give trade credit for an 
extended period to a geographically distant customer who is unable to pay within the cash 
discount period because they have limited access to external finance.  In such cases, the seller 
may pressure the buyer to pay using funds from a BA issued by the buyer’s bank.  The buyer’s 
bank may be more willing to issue a BA than an unsecured loan owing to the difference in 
collateral or because it has better information about the buyer’s credit quality and can signal this 
to BA investors in an incentive-compatible way by guaranteeing (accepting) the BA. 
In addition, in the event that the goods-buying firm does not repay, the buyer’s bank may 
be more able to repossess the goods financed with a BA using collection processes than the   6
goods-selling firm.  However, the extra paper and legal work in creating a BA versus a standard 
loan suggests that many borrowers would be better off with a loan unless the bank requires 
collateral that the borrower could not provide absent a BA or unless the value of collateral 
induces banks to offer loan rates on unsecured loans above those on BAs.  These factors imply 
that the relative use of BAs increases with macro default risk, while that of commercial paper 
would, consistent with the ratios plotted in Figure 1 and real levels shown in Figure 2.
1 
Why Liquidity Risk May Affect The Use of Bankers Acceptances 
Another attractive aspect of BAs was banks’ ability to sell BAs, which made BAs easier 
to fund than business loans, for which deposits were needed (Duffield and Summers, 1981). The 
BA market was very liquid in the 1920s and 1930s because the Federal Reserve conducted open 
market operations in it (Federer, 2003) and Small and Clouse, 2006).  For this reason, BA 
issuance reduced the impact of the risk of bank deposit runs on the banks’ ability to meet 
customer credit needs. An additional funding advantage was that banks were required to hold 
reserves against deposits needed to fund loans, but not against BAs that they issued and sold. 
Furthermore, even if banks held BAs they issued, BAs were more liquid than loans.  Prior 
to 1932, only commercial paper and BAs held by banks were eligible as collateral for discount 
loans; and it was not until late 1935 that the Federal Reserve allowed some types of loans to 
serve as collateral for discount loans.  In 1932, Congress granted the Federal Reserve limited 
temporary authority to rediscount promissory notes secured to the satisfaction of the Federal 
Reserve under the Glass-Steagall Act.  The Federal Reserve interpreted this provision as giving it 
limited authority to accept government securities as well as commercial paper and BAs as 
collateral for discount loans (The New York Clearinghouse Association, 1953, p.76).
2  The 
                                                           
1 Asset-backed commercial paper is relatively new.  Unlike BAs which are collateralized by re-sellable goods, much 
“asset-backed” commercial paper is collateralized by paper assets, whose market values have fallen since mid-2007.  
2 Likely reflecting this limited change at the Fed, a dummy variable controlling for this limited and temporary 
authority was insignificant in regressions not shown. 






















Figure 2: During Depression Era, Real Levels of Domestic Bankers Acceptances














Banking Act of 1935 gave the Federal Reserve permanent authority to rediscount promissory 
notes secured by any sound asset.  In response, the Federal Reserve explicitly expanded the types 
of eligible assets to include FHA and other satisfactory mortgages, installment credit, and U.S. 
government and municipal securities (pp. 34-35, Hunt, 1940).  This Act was introduced in 
January 1935 and passed in August 1935.  The provisions about assets eligible for rediscounting 
were not controversial unlike those about open market operations and the make-up of the Federal 
Reserve Board (Burns, 1974).  Likely reflecting an anticipated easing of rediscounting eligibility 
which reduced the relative attractiveness of holding BAs, the stock of BAs declined rapidly early 
that year.  Accordingly, some specifications include dummy variables for this regime shift. 
Why Bank Run Risk May Affect The Use of Bankers Acceptances 
These considerations imply that the relative use of BAs may also rise with the risk of 
bank runs, as proxied by the currency-to-deposit ratio.  Nevertheless, there may be counter-
vailing factors.  One appealing aspect of owning BAs to investors is that the bank issuing the BA   8
guarantees repayment of principal and implied interest regardless of whether the goods-buying 
firm repays the issuing bank.  That said, confidence in the value of this guarantee may be low 
when the risk of bank failures is high.  Finally, testing for the impact of bank run risk would be 
appropriate if the analysis focused on total BAs.  However, in this study detecting any effect may 
be difficult because the analysis focuses on BAs that finance domestic commerce—which were 
not the bulk of total BAs—to focus on financial frictions effects on domestic borrowing. 
Why Liquidity and Bank Run Risk May Also Affect The Use of Commercial Paper 
The impact of default and liquidity risk on BA use may have been relevant to the Great 
Depression era, when borrower default risk and the liquidity risk posed by bank runs encouraged 
banks to shift their portfolios toward less risky assets (Calomiris and Mason, 2004).  These types 
of risk may have also affected the relative use of commercial paper and bankers acceptances, 
both of which are highly liquid and have short-maturities.  Since the mid-1970s, un-backed 
commercial paper has been issued by firms who pose negligible default risk (in line with 
Diamond, 1991).  Firms issuing paper are typically required by the market to have back-up lines 
of bank credit that eliminate most liquidity risk associated with their ability to pay on time.     
For two reasons, however, higher default and liquidity risk during the Great Depression 
also plausibly made BAs a more feasible source of external finance than commercial paper.  
First, even highly regarded paper issuers posed default risk in that unusual era which preceded 
the asset-backed commercial paper market and during which the credit-ratings of many highly 
rated firms had been cut by ratings agencies (Wigmore, 1985).  Second, it was not until the late 
1970s, when large banks had access to well-developed, large time deposit and other funding 
markets that paper-issuing firms could easily and normally obtain lines of bank credit to back up 
their issuance of paper.  Thus, when concerns about liquidity risk rose dramatically, they may 
have affected investor perceptions about the liquidity risk of commercial paper during the 1930s.      9
III. Data and Variables 
Bankers Acceptances and Commercial Paper 
  Federal Reserve data are used to construct the ratio of bankers acceptances to commercial 
paper (BACP).  Both components were seasonally adjusted using a multiplicative X-11 
procedure, which yielded a ratio that was similar had the ratio rather than the components been 
seasonally adjusted.  The advantage of separately adjusting each component is that the same 
resulting BA series is used to construct a real BA series that is also modeled.  The BA series that 
is analyzed excludes BAs used to finance international trade, which are less reflective of 
domestic activity and more reflective of swings in international trade that were buffeted by 
changes in trade barriers such as the Smoot-Hawley Tariff.  A big advantage in using a ratio is 
that, in principle, it largely eliminates the need to scale for the level of business activity.  Another 
advantage is that it generally avoids the need to deflate a nominal level, which entails choosing a 
price index from the very limited set of available pre-WWII price indexes.  However, the overall 
producer price index is used to deflate BA’s and commercial paper to see how each component 
behaved and to test for any impact of financial frictions on the real level of BA use.  A decline in 
real commercial paper and a rise in real BAs were behind the jump in BACP during the early 
1930s (Figure 2).  This is consistent with a fall in the availability of non-collateralized finance 
(e.g., commercial paper) and a surge toward collateralized finance either from former paper 
issuers or traditional bank loan borrowers who lost access to unsecured bank loans. 
  Monthly Federal Reserve data on BAs and commercial paper are available between 
December 1924 and December 1941.  In 1940-41, there was a large jump in commercial paper, 
which plausibly reflected a surge in U.S. production of defense goods purchased by the U.S. and 
UK during 1940 and 1941.  Because many firms with defense contracts could be viewed as 
having both safe revenue sources and even implicit government-backing on their debt obligations 
(like commercial paper), the data used in the analysis is restricted to December 1924 to   10
December 1939 to prevent the sample from being contaminated with the omitted variable bias 
associated with the ramping up of defense spending in the early 1940s.   
Default and Liqiudity Risk 
  Default and liquidity risk combined are tracked by spreads between yields on investment 
grade corporate and long-term U.S. government bonds based on the view that yield spreads 
between risky and default free bonds generally reflect cyclical swings in default risk and default 
risk premiums (Jaffee, 1975).  One such spread is that between yields on A-rated corporate 
bonds (Moodys) and long-term U.S. government bonds, denoted as ATR  (source: Federal 
Reserve (1943), also available from NBER’s Macrohistory Database).  ATR  was used instead of 
the spread between Baa-rated corporate and Treasury bonds (BAATR), which, unlike ATR and 
the BA variables, does not have a unit root on a quarterly frequency (upper panel, Table 5) and 
exhibits only marginal evidence of a unit root on a monthly basis (upper panel, Table 1).   
Also used is the spread between average investment grade corporate bond yields and 
long-term U.S. government bonds (COTR).  Under more “normal” market conditions, there is a 
preference in the empirical literature to look at spreads between yields on different ratings 
classes of bonds, as such spreads may arguably capture swings in the overall default risk.  
However, there were many downgrades of corporate bonds during the Depression in response to 
the worsening economy (Wigmore, 1985).  This factor suggests that a quality spread based on 
the average corporate bond yield might better track changes in default risk than a spread based 
on a particular ratings class of bonds.  Indeed, the spread between on average investment grade 
corporate and long-term Treasury bonds (COTR) somewhat outperforms the spread between 
yields on A-rated corporate and long-term U.S. government bonds (ATR).  Although they tend to 
move closely together, the quality spread based on average corporate yields moved up a little less 
than the ATR during the 1931-1932 portion of the Depression era (Figure 3). 


















Figure 3: Bond Quality Spreads and Currency-Deposit Ratios
ratio % points
A-rated Corporate - 
Long-Term Treasury Yields
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Because ATR and COTR are spreads of corporate yields over long-term Treasury yields, 
they arguably track both default risk and liquidity risk in contrast to spreads between yields on 
low-rated and high-rated investment grade bonds.  ATR can be decomposed into the spread 
between Aaa- and A-rated corporate bonds, plus the spread between Aaa-rated corporate and 
long-term Treasury bonds.  The Aaa-Treasury spread likely includes a premium reflecting both  
the extra liquidity of Treasury bonds and less prepayment risk—the latter because the Treasury 
has never prepaid and then refinanced outstanding bonds (Duca, 1999).  Hence, in principle, the 
two spreads (Aaa-A and Aaa-Treasury) could be used instead of a single spread (A-Treasury).   
However, in practice, several considerations favor using a single spread.  First, in 
unusually risky periods like the Depression, even Aaa-rated firms posed some default risk.  
Second, such risk is also reflected in the unusually high incidence of corporate downgrades 
during the Great Depression.  As a result, during this era even the Aaa-Treasury spread reflects 
movements in default risk.  Third, this factor is even more important because logs of variables   12
are used, which raises problems arising from Jenson’s inequality associated with decomposing 
spreads like ATR and COTR into log subcomponents.  Fourth, there is a high degree of 
correlation between the Aaa-Treasury and A-Aaa spreads during this era, raising problems of 
multi-collinearity—particularly using cointegration techniques on a sample spanning 15 years.  
Likely reflecting these considerations, other results (not shown in the tables) which used 
components like the logs of the Aaa-Treasury and A-Treasury spreads, gave unusual results. 
For three reasons, the analysis uses bond quality spreads rather than interest rate spreads 
between BAs and commercial paper.  First, the latter may introduce simultaneity bias.  Second, 
switching to the BA-commercial paper rate spread did not materially affect the key results.  
Third, interpreting bond spreads is easier since the BA-commercial paper rate spread may also 
reflect relative money market conditions from factors other than default or liquidity risk.          
Currency-To-Deposit Ratios 
  As suggested by much of the monetarist literature (e.g., Friedman and Schwartz, 1963), 
ratios of currency held outside of the banking system to bank deposits can be used as indicators 
of the risk of bank deposit runs or the public’s lack of confidence in the banking system.  Two 
such ratios are considered, both constructed with Friedman and Schwartz data that are available 
from the NBER.  One is the ratio of currency to demand deposits (CDRAT) and the other is the 
ratio of currency to demand plus time deposits (CTDRAT).  Both are plotted in Figure 3. 
Other Financial Crisis or Regulatory Variables 
  Changes in bank regulation plausibly affected the use of BAs.  Two monthly dummies 
are used to control for the impact of the Banking Act of 1935.  BANKACT359 equals zero before 
September 1935 (and one thereafter), when the Banking Act officially took effect.  The other, 
BANKACT351, equals one since January 1935, when money market participants may have acted 
in anticipation of the Act’s passage. These long-term dummy variables did not perform well.     13
This was particularly true with a quarterly dummy, BANKACT35, which equaled 1 from 
1935:Q3 on.  To conserve space these runs are not shown in the table.  Nevertheless, there are 
some outsized swings in BACP and the real level of BAs just before and just after the Banking 
Act was enacted.  As a check to see whether these short-run effects altered the short- and long- 
coefficients in quarterly vector-error correction models, a short-run dummy (BACTDD) was 
included in some models, which equaled 1 in 1935:q3, negative 1 in 1935:q4, and 0 otherwise. 
  In addition, some regressions also included a 0-1 variable to account for any temporary, 
outsized, impact of the banking crisis of March 1933.  The monthly version of this variable, 
BANKHOLID, equals one in March 1933, when fears of a banking collapse gripped the U.S., 
inducing President Roosevelt to order a bank holiday.  During that shutdown, regulators 
examined the books of banks and reopened only the ones deemed solvent ones that month.  
Reflecting that the holiday occurred late in March and that the public’s confidence in banks was 
still shaken in April, the monthly version of BANKHOLID also equals one in April 1933 and the 
quarterly version of this variable equals 1 in 1933:q2 and 0 otherwise.  The large jump in relative 
BA use without a large jump in default risk spreads during these months strongly suggests that 
extreme fears of bank runs at that time induced a flight to collateralized finance.  
IV. Empirical Findings 
This section presents cointegration tests to assess the relationship between the relative use 
of BAs and the two measures of risk on a monthly basis.  Then, short-run findings from vector 
error-correction models are reviewed.  Quarterly results are provided as a robustness check.  
Finally, the absolute levels of real BAs are analyzed to see if findings regarding the relative use 
of BAs (e.g., BACP) are not merely an artifact of comparing BA use with commercial paper. 
4.1  Montlhy Cointegration Results 
  Cointegration analysis should be used to detect long run relationships among 
nonstationary variables (Engle and Granger, 1987), preferably in logs.  Since the logs of monthly   14
and quarterly BA use (denoted with an L before BACP) have unit roots (allowing for possible 
time trends) as do the default risk spreads LCOTR and ATR,  cointegration tests are used to test 
for long-run relationships among the relative use of BAs and one default risk spread (LATR or 
LCOTR).  Each of these variables has a unit root, being nonstationary in levels and stationary in 
first differences, according to augmented-Dickey-Fuller statistics that are insignificant for the 
levels and significant for the first differences of each variable (upper panel Table 1).  Somewhat 
stronger results were found using LCOTR, whose results are presented first in Table 1. 
Tests found only one cointegrating vector for LBACP and LCOTR for samples including 
and excluding observations after the Banking Act of 1935 (vectors 1 and 8) based on two 
standard cointegration test statistics (Table 1).  One is the trace statistic, which rejected only the 
absence of one cointegrating vector in each case at the 5 percent level using Johansen-Juselius’s 
(1990) rank significance criterion.  The other statistic is the maximum eigenvalue statistic, which 
also only rejected the absence of one cointegrating vector in each case at the 5 percent level.  In 
each case, vectors minimizing the Akaike information statistic favored a lag length of 1 month. 
Combined with the insignificant statistics for the existence of more than 1 cointegrating vector 
(not shown), these findings support the hypothesis that one long-run (cointegrating) relationship 
exists among each group of variables.  For the unique estimated vectors 1 and 2, the quality 
spread is highly significant with the hypothesized sign, since flipping the coefficient signs in the 
cointegrating vector (e.g., LBACP t = 1.798746 + 3.706096*LCOTR t from vector 1) implies that 
equilibrium use of BA’s relative to commercial paper is increasing in the spread between yields 
on investment grade corporate and long-term Treasury yields.  Similar results that support the 
financial frictions hypothesis were obtained in vector error-correction models (VECMs, which 
jointly estimate long- and short-term relationships) that included BANKHOLIDAY as a short-run 
variable (vectors 2 and 8, Table 1).  Also encouraging is that actual log levels of BACP are 
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Figure 4: Estimated Equilbrium Relative BA Use Ratio Tracks and
Slightly Leads Actual Use During the Depression Era
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Although neither currency-to-deposit ratio has a unit root, vectors 3 and 4 added one such 
ratio to vectors 1 and 2 for robustness.  Evidence of cointegration is weaker, since only the trace 
statistics and not the maxEignen statistics were significant and because the existence of mutliple 
vectors could not be rejected.  Further, even if one significant vector were assumed (vectors 5 
and 6), the currency-to-deposit ratio was insignificant, while the coefficients and significance of 
LCOTR were unaffected.  Thus, there appears to be little role for the currency-to-deposit ratios.   
As another robustness check, a dummy for the Banking Act of 1935 was added to vectors 
1 and 2 in vectors 5 and 6.  In the absence of the Bank Holiday dummy, a unique cointegrating 
vector (vector 5) was found in which the significance and magnitude of the bond spread variable 
were basically unaffected, whereas the Banking Act dummy was insignificant.  In the presence 
of the bank holiday dummy, evidence of cointegration was weaker.  Even assuming that a unique 
vector is found (vector 6), the banking act variable remained insignificant while the significance 
and magnitude of the bond spread variable were basically unaffected.  Combined with evidence   16
excluding the 1935-39 sub-period yielded results (vectors 7 and 8) that were similar to those of 
vectors 1 and 2, the financial frictions hypothesis is not overturned by controlling for the effects 
of the Banking Act of 1935, which appear to be minor and largely insignificant.    
All of the above patterns of results are also obtained when the average corporate-
Treasury spread (COTR) was replaced by the A-Treasury bond yield spread (ATR), as can be 
seen by comparing models in Table 2 with corresponding models in Table 1. 
4.2 Monthly Vector-Error Correction Results 
  Models of changes in variables whose levels have unit roots and are cointegrated, should 
not omit information about long-run relationships to avoid misspecification (Engle and Granger, 
1987).  In addition to seeing how controlling for short-run effects may alter estimates of long-run 
relationships (see Tables 1 and 2), estimating those vector-error correction models (VECM’s), 
which jointly estimate long-run and short-run relationships, is helpful in seeing whether the long-
run relationships help explain short-run movements.  In estimating short-run movements (first 
differences of log-levels), the VECM’s regress the first difference in each long-run variable on 
lagged first differences of each long-run factor and include a lagged error-correction (EC) term 
equal to actual minus the estimated equilibrium values of the long-run variable modeled.  Table 3 
presents the short-run models of the relative use of BAs, with the error-correction terms based on 
the correspondingly numbered cointegrating vectors in Table 1 that use the spreads between the 
average investment grade corporate bond and long-term U.S. government bond yield.  Thus, the 
even numbered models each include the bank holiday dummy, while other models differ in the 
construction of their error-correction term and whether they include an extra t-1 lag first 
difference term from adding any additional long-run variable to the cointegrating vector. 
  Several interesting patterns arise.  First, the error-correction term is highly significant, 
with the anticipated negative sign.  Since the EC term equals actual minus equilibrium use, the   17
negative coefficients imply that the change in actual use will decline if actual use exceeded its 
estimated equilibrium level in the prior period.  Since the bond spread variable is significant with 
the anticipated sign in the long-run relationships, the short-run portions of the VECM’s also 
support the financial frictions view that high default risk will induce a greater relative use of 
collateralized finance.  Second, the sizes of the EC coefficients are reasonable, implying that 3 to 
4 percent of disequilibria are eliminated on average each month or roughly 30-40 percent per 
year.  A third pattern is that the bank holiday variable is highly significant, implying some 
additional flight to collateral effect beyond that captured by the bond risk spread, either 
implicitly either through the error-correction or the short-run ΔLCOTR term.  Fourth, consistent 
with the comparisons of vectors 1 and 2 with vectors 7 and 8 in Table 1 (and 2), models 1 and 2 
have similar coefficients when the sample excludes the 1935-39 sub-period, as in models 7 and 8 
which are placed next to models 1 and 2 in Table 3.  This implies that evidence in support of the 
financial frictions hypothesis is unaffected by the Banking Act of 1935.  Fifth, although the 
banking act variable is statistically insignificant in the long-run relationships (in vectors 5 and 6 
in Table 1), its first difference is significant in models 5 and 6, suggesting that the Banking Act 
of 1935 might have had some short-run effects on the patterns of finance.  Sixth, only models 1, 
2, 7, and 8, all of which focus solely on a long-run relationship between relative BA use 
(LBACP) and the corporate-Treasury yield spread (LCOTR), had residuals that were well 
behaved in contrast to other models that tried to include other (statistically insignificant) long-
term factors.  Finally, any evidence for short-run effects captured in the currency-to-deposit ratio 
is obtained in model 5, but disappears in the presence of the bank holiday variable (model 6).      
 As a robustness check, similar short-run models from VECM’s that replace the average 
corporate bond-Treasury yield spread (LCOTR) with the corporate A-Treasury (LATR) were 
estimated.  Comparing models in Table 4 with corresponding ones in Table 3 indicates that the 
results are qualitatively and quantitatively similar.  The only difference is that the models using   18
the average corporate-Treasury yield spread have slightly better fits and more statistically 
significant error-correction terms than models using the corporate A-Treasury spread.   
4.3 Exogeneity 
  A natural question is whether the bond yield spreads may be driven by the composition of 
the demand for business finance, which would greatly complicate the interpretation of the above 
findings.  In vector-error correction systems modeling monthly relative BA use, quarterly 
relative BA use (analyzed in section 4.4), and quarterly real use of BA’s, the error correction 
terms are highly significant in modeling BA use but are highly insignificant in modeling the 
corporate-Treasury bond yield spreads, indicating that these yield spreads are weakly exogenous 
to BA use.  These results point to an asymmetry to how the vector components adjust to 
disequilibria, with BA use making the significant adjustments.  Thus, consistent with theory, the 
equilibrium composition of short-term, external business credit is driven by the combination of 
default and liquidity risk measured in the spreads of corporate over Treasury bond yields.   
4.4 Quarterly Models of Relative BA Use 
Because monthly data are noisy and might obscure long-run patterns, the approach was 
repeated using quarterly averages of monthly data.  Table 5 and 6 summarize findings that 
correspond to the monthly results in Tables 1-4, with three differences.  First, Tables 5 and 6 
omit results that included a long-run dummy for the Banking Act of 1935 (=1 from 1935:q3-
1939:q4), which were similar to monthly results but were excluded to conserve space.  
Nevertheless, some models were tested to control for any short-run effects by including a short-
run dummy, BACTDD, which equals 1 in 1935:q3 and -1 in 1935:q4.  Second, because the 
number of degrees of freedom is greatly smaller, a sample excluding 1935-1939 was not 
presented owing to a very short-sample. Third, a quarterly dummy variable for the stock market 
crash of 1929 (STCRASHDD, equals 1 in 1929:q4, -1 in 1930:q1, and 0 otherwise) was included 
in some models as a robustness check.  By construction, STCRASHDD imposes that any short-  19
run boost to the use of BA’s relative to commercial paper in 1929:q4 is unwound completely in 
the first quarter of 1930.  Likely reflecting an unwinding that is faster than the normal error-
correction process, this variable outperformed a dummy that equaled 1 in 1929:q4 and 0, 
otherwise in regressions not shown.  In monthly models not reported, a monthly dummy for the 
October 1929 crash was very insignificant, in contrast to the significant quarterly coefficient 
found in every model.  This difference may reflect that the noisiness of monthly data might 
obscure some short-run effects.  In fact, virtually all the patterns seen in the monthly results were 
obtained in the quarterly models.  The notable exception is that the inclusion of controls for the 
short-run effects of the bank holiday, the October 1929 stock market crash, and the Banking Act 
of 1935 more substantially improves the fit of the short-run models.  Nevertheless, 
corresponding monthly and quarterly models that omit such short-run variables had similar fits. 
The non-stationarity of corporate spreads use over the sample may concern some readers 
who are uncomfortable with the notion of a unit root in corporate spreads (note that the currency-
deposit ratios clearly had long-lasting changes in their levels).  To allay this concern, one-stage 
versions of models 1-3 and 5-7 were run replacing error-correction terms (dated t-1) from 
cointegration tests with the t-1 lag levels of relative BA use and corporate spreads. Two quarterly 
lags of the first difference of relative BA use and one quarterly lag of the first difference in 
corporate spreads are included to control for other short-run dynamic effects.  As shown in 
Appendix Table A1, the qualitative results are similar.  In these models, the significant negative 
coefficients on the lag log-level of BA use imply that the gap between the implied long-run 
equilibrium and actual BA use is eliminated at quarterly speeds of adjustment of 11-16 percent. 
4.5 Quarterly Models of Real BA Use 
  To see whether these basic results are robust to using absolute rather than relative levels 
of BA use, the log level of real BAs (BALEV ) is analyzed with similar variables with a few 
adjustments.  First, BAs are deflated using the overall wholesale price index (source: NBER   20
Macrohistory Database).  Second, reflecting the need for some control for the impact of overall 
economic activity on the demand for finance, the NBER index of business activity (BUSACT) is 
included in addition to the long-run variables used earlier.  As indicated in the upper-panel of 
Table 7, the log levels of both variables (denoted with L’s at the start of level variable names) 
have unit roots according to augmented Dickey-Fuller statistics.  Cointegration tests were first 
conducted on vectors (numbers 1 and 5 in Table 7) that included just LBALEV, one spread 
variable (LCOTR or LATR), and LBUSACT.  Third, also tested were other vectors (numbers 2 
and 6, Table 7) that added the bank holiday variable, as well as vectors (numbers 3 and 7) that 
added all three short run variables, BANKHOLIDAY, BACTDD, and STCRASH.  These are 
similar to variables used in analyzing quarterly, relative BA use (BACP) except that the October 
1929 stock crash dummy equals 1 in 1929:4 and 0 otherwise.  This implicitly assumes less of an 
unwinding effect in 1930:q1 than in the stock crash dummy in the BACP models, which also 
equaled minus 1 in 1930:q1.  Consistent with the differences in the construction of these stock 
crash variables was a sharp plunge of commercial paper in 1929:q4 followed by a sharp recovery 
in 1930:q1, which would affect LBACP more than LBALEV.  Finally, corresponding to vectors 3 
and 7 which include all three short-run financial variables, vectors 7 and 8 also include the log of 
the currency-to-demand deposit ratio, LCDRATIO, which had a.d.f. statistics closer to exhibiting 
a unit root than the currency-to-total deposits ratio (LCTDRATIO). (In other models—not 
presented to conserve space—a long-run dummy for the Banking Act of 1935 was insignificant.) 
  Unique cointegrating relationships were found in each case, with lag lengths of 4 for all 
but the two VECMs (vectors 1 and 5) that excluded BANKHOLIDAY, BACTDD, and STCRASH, 
in which case 5 lags were needed to find a unique vector.  Several patterns emerge from these 
vectors in Table 7 and the short-run models in Table 8.  First, the quality spread and business 
activity variables are statistically significant, with the hypothesized signs, reflecting that BA use 
is increasing in the levels of default risk and economic activity.  Second, the currency-to-deposit   21
ratio is statistically significant, with a sign indicating that high currency-to-deposit ratios are 
associated with lower BA use, ceteris paribus.  This result suggests that the negative effects of 
investor concerns about the value of bank guarantees on BAs that may have been reflected in the 
currency-deposit ratio likely outweighed the positive effects of increased incentives for banks to 
issue BAs than make traditional loans.  Third, the inclusion of the currency-deposit ratio 
increases the magnitude of the coefficient on the quality spread, while reducing that of the 
business activity index.  Nevertheless, the qualitative results regarding the effects of 
liquidity/default risk and business activity on BA use are unaffected by the presence of currency-
deposit ratios. Also noteworthy is how the inclusion of the short-run banking/financial variables 
very noticeably improves the fit of the corresponding models, implying that the banking act of 
1935 had temporary depressing effects on the real level of BA use, while the stock market crash 
and bank holiday episodes induced more use of BA financing, consistent with a flight to 
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these short-run event controls, the implied long-run equilibrium relationship from quality spreads  
and the business activity index track and slightly lead actual log levels of real BAs well (Figure 
5). Overall, the findings for the level of real BA use are consistent with those for the use of BAs 
relative to commercial paper.   
V.  Bond Yield Spreads and Business Credit Composition During the Current Crisis 
5.1 An Empirical Specification of the Paper-Bank Loan Mix 
Since the late 1930s, BAs have become much less important reflecting the deepening of 
credit markets and the Fed’s shift to conducting open market operations in Treasuries.  This 
makes the ratio of BAs to commercial paper less informative.  Also, the deepening of the 
commercial paper market from the rise of asset-backed paper implies that the links between 
commercial paper and real activity are more complicated than during the 1930s.  Accordingly, 
instead of BACP or the real levels of BAs or commercial paper, we model commercial paper as a 
share of commercial paper plus business loans (CPBLMIX, see Kashyap, Wilcox, and Stein, 
1997). CPBLIMIX is total commercial paper outstanding (consistently defined since 2001) as a 
share of commercial paper and commercial and industrial loans at all commercial banks.  It 
differs from the mix variable of Kashyap, et al (1997) in including all commercial paper, rather 
than just paper issued by nonfinancial corporations.  The reason for the difference is the 
increasing use during the early part of the decade of credit at many nonfinancial companies who 
borrowed financial entities who funded the credit by issuing asset-backed paper.  Paper issued 
directly by nonfinancial firms declined in relative terms during much of the decade, as did bank 
loans, both of which lost market share to asset-backed paper funded credit.   
To make the analysis more comparable with that for the Great Depression, CPBLMIX is 
modeled as a function of the spread between Baa corporate and 10-year Treasury bond yields   23
(BAA10TR).
3  Rises in this spread reflect that investors demand higher premiums for corporate 
default and liquidity risk.  Such rises are less of a threat to the funding of bank loans, as banks 
had greater access to insured deposits and the Fed’s liquidity facilities, particularly before mid-
October 2008.  As a result, the price and non-price terms of commercial paper would likely rise 
relative to those of bank loans, implying a negative relationship between the commercial paper 
share of short-term business credit (CPBLMIX) and the corporate yield spread (Figure 6a and 
6b).  Interestingly, spreads between Baa and Aaa-rated corporate bond yields rose almost as high 
in late 2008 as during the worst of the Great Depression (Figure 7).  Being the largest component 
of the Baa-10-year Treasury yield spread, this spread suggests that default and liquidity risk 
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Figure 7: In late-2008, Baa-Aaa Bond Yield Spreads Jumped to 
Their Highest Levels Since late-1933 Percent
   25
The 3-month TED (LIBOR- T-bill rate) spread is included in case the conditions in the 
LIBOR market appreciably affected the bank lending component of the mix variable.  However, 
because commercial paper issuers usually have back-up lines of credit at banks, the impact of 
LIBOR swings on the mix variable is likely more limited than that of swings in risk premia on 
corporate bonds.
 4  Nevertheless there may be some marginal information in swings in the TED 
spread given that the bond and TED spreads do not move completely in unison (Figures 8 and 9).   
To model the impact of Federal Reserve and Treasury actions and announcements in October 
2008, interactive variables are tested.  These variables multiply the corporate bond yield spread 
(BAA10TR) and a dummy (FP) equal to 1 between October 2008 and July 2009, and 0 otherwise.  
The dummy is designed to proxy for the combined effects of three Federal Reserve and Treasury 
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Figure 8: Commerical Paper Spreads Narrow Following Announced 
Fed Actions Affecting Money Funds and Commercial Paper
Note: Spreads based on prime (nonfinancial and financial) commercial paper rate until 1996; financial paper thereafter.












                                                           
4 For the impact of Fed actions on the LIBOR market, see Armantier, et al. (2008), Williams and Taylor (2009), and 
Wu (2008). For information on Fed credit programs , see www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/recentactions.htm,  
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mutual funds.  The second was the Fed’s decision to create a new funding facility that would 
lend to depository institutions in order for them to purchase ABCP from money funds 
experiencing significant redemption pressures. This was done to help prevent a flood of money-
fund redemptions from setting off a disorderly sale of commercial paper into an unsettled 
market.   Because this action was unlikely to fully alleviate increased uncertainty that firms 
might be unable to issue new paper to repay maturing debt if investors became too risk averse, 
the Fed also announced it would fund purchases of top-rated commercial paper via a new facility 
that is supported by the Treasury—the commercial paper funding facility (CPFF).   
Under this back-stop facility, unsecured three-month A1/P1-rated paper is purchased at a 
rate equal to the three-month OIS rate plus 100 basis points, and if the issuer does not provide 
sufficient collateral, plus another 100 basis points.  Unsecured asset-backed, A1/P1-rated paper 
is purchased at a rate equal to the three-month OIS rate plus 300 basis points.   Owing to the 
penalty discount pricing, the build-up of paper purchased in a crisis through the CPFF will 
reverse with a short lag following the unwinding of a financial crisis.  In this way, the back-up   27
facility created during a period of heightened stress has less marginal effect when crisis 
conditions in the paper market return toward normal.  To capture this feature, the 0-1 variable 
(FP) equals 1 in the months (October 2008 and July 2009) when the Fed held at least 10 percent 
of total U.S.-issued commercial paper. In principle, the dummy variable, FP, which equals 1 
from October 2008 to July 2009, may also capture other roughly contemporaneous government 
interventions, such as the FDIC's Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program, TARP legislation, 
and capital injections. However, the fading of relative use of the CPFF to holding less than 10 
percent of outstanding commercial paper in August 2009 is not contemporaneous with the 
ending of those programs.  Furthermore, the interaction variable loses significance if the 
unwinding backstop feature of the CPFF is not taken into account by simply defining FP to equal 
one in all months since October 2008, which would better align with the ongoing aspects of 
those other facilities.  Nevertheless, it is difficult to completely disentangle the effects of these 
other facilities. 
Reflecting the cushioning effect of such actions on the impact of higher default and 
liquidity risk pressures, the interactive term FP *BAA10TR is hypothesized to have an opposite 
sign from a non-interactive yield spread.  Those hypothesized signs implicitly assume that the 
net effect of Fed and Treasury actions to bolster money market conditions and the banking 
system had larger short-run cushioning effects on commercial paper market than on bank loans, 
which, a priori, is an empirical issue.  
Under another liquidity program, the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility 
(TALF) which was started after a long delay in March 2009 (announced in December 2009), the 
Fed purchases top-tier rated asset-backed medium-term debt that funds several types of loans, 
included business loans backed by the Small Business Administration, equipment loans, credit 
cards, student loans, and auto loans.  In this program, issuers voluntarily approach the facility for 
funding after packaging such securities in accordance with the terms of the program.  The start of   28
TALF in March 2009 was accompanied by a revival of commercial paper issuance that later 
ebbed in April.  Indeed, in all the models March 2009 was a large, positive outlier that largely 
unwound in April.   Paper issuers and investors may have had miss-placed hopes that the TALF 
would help improve liquidity conditions in the commercial paper market for two reasons.  First, 
reports indicated that markets were apparently disappointed by the low initial volumes of TALF 
purchases.  Second, and perhaps more importantly, the TALF was designed mainly to improve 
liquidity conditions in medium-term asset-backed securities used to fund consumer and business 
loans over the medium-, not the very short-run.  The liquidity problems arising during the 
financial crisis has fostered some segmentation of securities markets (and was a major rationale 
for asset market interventions by the Fed and Treasury) that plausibly limited spill-over effects of 
the TALF on the commercial paper market.  Some models include, ΔTALF, equal to 1 in March 
2009, -1 in April, and 0 otherwise.  Comparing models 3 with 4 and models 7 with 8, including 
ΔTALF cleans up residuals without altering key coefficient estimates other than the TED spread. 
To handle unusual event risks that boosted liquidity risk, a dummy variable (Aug14, = 1 
in 2007:08, = 0 otherwise) is included for the market reaction to the August 9, 2007 decision by 
some European hedge funds to halt redemptions, owing to the lack of market trades on many of 
their subprime mortgage-related assets.  This induced a surge in LIBOR-OIS and LIBOR-
Treasury spreads that was not immediately picked up by a surge in corporate bond yield spreads 
or the t-1 lag of the TED spread.  On similar grounds, a dummy for the September 2008 failure 
of Lehman (Lehman = 1 in 2008:09, 0 otherwise) is also included.  Finally, reflecting that 
commercial paper issuance (and hence CPBLMIX) is more dependent on the need to finance 
inventories (see Kashyap, Wilcox, and Stein, 1993), regressions also included the log of the 
monthly ISM purchasing managers’ (manufacturing) index of inventory demand, which tracks 
the change in inventories and is more timely than inventory-shipment ratio data and much less 
subject to revisions (LINV).  An alternative control for inventories is the 3-month change in the   29
log ISM index (Δ3LINV), where the three-month change reflects the tendency for commercial 
paper to have a 3-month maturity.  Note that the timing of the ISM survey is early in a month, 
and tends to reflect activity in month t-1 (a tendency noted by Harris, 1991).  For this reason 
simultaneity is not much of an issue since using the time t dated index essentially reflects activity 
in period t-1.  Furthermore, the index is used as a scaling variable to control for the influence of 
inventory swings on the mix variable. 
In the short sample over which commercial paper data are consistently defined (2001:01-
2009:09), the paper-mix and bond yield spread variables are I(2),
5 reflecting that at the end of the 
sample, the paper mix plunges while the bond yield spreads soar, leading to serial correlation in 
both levels and first differences at the sample’s end.  To limit distortions from such trends, the 
models regress first differences of the paper-loan mix on first differences of yield spreads for 
months t-1 through t-3 in the presence of control variables (Aug14, Lehman, and LINV/Δ3LINV).   
5.2 Empirical Results From Modeling the Paper-Bank Loan Mix During the Crisis 
Table 9 presents results from eight regressions that reflect different sample periods and 
first difference rate spread variables (Δrspread).  Models (1)-(4) use the log-linear ISM inventory 
index, while models (5)-(8) instead use the 3-month change in the log of the index, but otherwise 
correspond to models (1)-(4) with respect to sample periods and variables.  Model 1 covers the 
sample through October 2008 and omits any controls for Federal Reserve and Treasury 
programs.  As hypothesized, the t-1 and t-3 lags of ΔBAATR are negative and significant (the t-2 
lag is insignificant), as are the financial crisis dummies (Aug14 and Lehman).  However, when 
the sample is extended to end in September 2009, the time t-1 lag ΔBAATR is no longer 
significant and even has a positive sign.  Results are similar in models (5) and (6) using a slightly 
                                                           
5 As per the modified AIC and SIC criteria.   30
different control for inventory activity.
6  This shift in coefficients suggests that the new credit 
programs may have affected the impact of liquidity and default risk premiums on the relative use 
of commercial paper and bank loans.  
To shed more light on that hypothesis, models 3, 4, 7, and 8 are estimated over the full 
sample and include a 0-1 variable (FP) for the liquidity programs multiplied by the first 
difference of the bond yield spread.  The inclusion of these terms yields non-interactive rate 
spread coefficients that are similar to those in samples ending in October 2008, and interactive 
rate spreads (FP*ΔBAATR) that are jointly significant.  In particular, the interactive rate spread 
coefficients at lags t-1 and t-3 are highly statistically significant and oppositely signed from the 
non-interactive rate spreads, consistent with liquidity programs having a desired effect.  One 
caveat is that March 2009 is a big enough positive outlier, that there is evidence of serial 
correlation in the residuals for all the full sample models (2, 3, 6, and 7) that omit the TALF 
program variable.  This problem appears corrected by the presence of the ΔTALF variable in the 
interactive-spread models (4 and 8).  The overall patterns of results suggest that the Federal 
Reserve and Treasury liquidity programs have helped stabilize the relative use of commercial 
paper by counteracting the influence of wider liquidity and default risk premiums. Nevertheless 
this interpretation and the findings as a whole should be viewed with caution in light of the short 
sample, which makes it infeasible to estimate error-correction models using levels of spreads 
with cointegration techniques that may more fully reflect the short- and long-run influences of 
securities market conditions on credit flows. 
During the early 1930s, the Federal Reserve did not actively intervene in commercial 
paper purchases when commercial paper plunged in tandem with rising corporate liquidity and 
                                                           
6 Note that owing to little variation in the inventory diffusion index in the short sample ending in 2008:08, it is 
difficult to identify an effect of inventories.  However, in the longer sample, the inventory variable mainly has a 
positive and at least marginally statistically significant coefficient, consistent with the general use of commercial 
paper to finance working capital (such as inventories) and the results of Kashyap, Wilcox, and Stein (1993).   31
default risk premiums, even after it was granted discretion to do so in the summer of 1932 in an 
amendment (section 13(3)) of the Federal Reserve Act.  In contrast to that episode, the Federal 
Reserve has intervened to provide liquidity in the commercial paper market during the current 
crisis, especially since October 2008.  Although the samples are too short to be definitive, the 
evidence thus far supports the working hypothesis that these actions have helped stabilize the use 
of commercial paper by countering rising liquidity premiums on corporate debt. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
  This study analyzes the relative use of a collateralized and easily funded source of 
external business finance during the Great Depression and relates those results to money market 
conditions during the current financial crisis.  Because the forms of finance examined (bankers 
acceptances and commercial paper) are short-lived, the timing of their movements should have 
been more closely related to contemporaneous changes in default risk spreads than were 
bank/firm failures or movements in the stock of bank loans, which lag the economy more and 
have been used in prior studies of the Great Depression.  The analysis uses spreads on yields 
between on A-rated corporate and U.S. Treasury bonds, as well as those between average 
investment-grade corporate bonds to track ex ante default and liquidity risk premiums.  Also 
assessed were currency-to-deposit ratios, which could have risen with liquidity risk pressures on 
banks, which would tend to boost BA use or which could have increased with investor doubts 
about the value of banks’ backing of BAs, which would lower BA use.  Evidence of a net impact 
of bank run risk, as proxied by currency-to-deposit ratios, is weak or mixed—with a negative 
effect on balance—perhaps reflecting that the ratios may track countervailing factors. 
Consistent with Bernanke (1983) and the pre-World War II studies of Kimmel (1939) and 
Young (1932), evidence indicates that the provision of credit shifted towards collateralized debt 
and debt whose funding sources were less vulnerable to liquidity shocks in reaction to swings in   32
default and possibly liquidity risk during the Great Depression.  In particular, the real level of 
bankers acceptances and their use relative to non-collateralized commercial paper were strongly 
and positively related to bond quality yield spreads.  Furthermore, these shifts in the composition 
of external finance were large and persistent, supporting the view that financial frictions and 
reduced credit availability played an important role in depressing the U.S. economy in the 1930s. 
Also significant were short-run events, such as the October 1929 stock market crash and the 
1933 bank holiday that sparked flights to quality in the bond market and a flight to quality (BAs) 
in the money market and perhaps from the loan market. Overall, the findings from the Great 
Depression era are consistent with the implications of research on financial frictions and flights 
to quality (e.g., Bernanke and Blinder, 1988; Bernanke and Gertler, 1989; Bernanke, Gertler, and 
Gilchrist, 1996; Jaffee and Russell, 1976; Kashyap, Wilcox, and Stein (1993); Keeton, 1979; 
Lang and Nakamura, 1995; and Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). 
Those findings are analogous to analyzing the composition of short-term business credit 
during the current financial crisis.  In particular, up until the Federal Reserve and Treasury 
actions of October 2008, when corporate-Treasury bond yield spreads rose, the use of security-
markets funded commercial paper fell relative to bank business loans, which could be funded 
with insured deposits.  This linkage broke down after the Fed and Treasury’s announcements to 
purchase commercial paper, provide discount loans to money market funds, and insure money 
market fund accounts.   The pre-October 2008 pattern and the ensuing break from it suggest that 
the 2008 pullback in commercial paper outstanding owed to spikes in liquidity premiums.  This 
interpretation is plausible because higher liquidity premiums on the commercial paper are more 
amenable to being addressed by the post-September 2008 actions of the Fed and the Treasury, 
than are most of solvency questions about commercial paper issuers.  Thus far, these actions 
appear to have helped prevent an even sharper pullback in commercial paper and helped foster a 
reversal of the jump in the commercial paper-Treasury bill spread around the failure of Lehman.    33
Such an interpretation is tentative and preliminary mainly because of the short sample 
available for analyzing consistent measures of commercial paper and because the financial crisis 
is not yet over.   Nevertheless, earlier evidence from the Great Depression era indicates that 
security-funded sources of external finance, such as commercial paper, are highly vulnerable to 
the jumps in liquidity risk premiums that typically characterize financial crises.  Indeed, real 
commercial paper outstanding fell 85 percent between July 1930 and May 1933.  Furthermore, 
recent experience suggests that such surges in liquidity premiums can be countered by 
appropriate central bank asset purchases, thereby cushioning the supply of security-funded credit 
to high quality borrowers.  By means of comparison, real commercial paper fell 74 percent 
during the 25 months between July 1930 and August 1932, but by a less dramatic 44 percent in 
the 25 months between July 2007 and August 2009.  Of course, some of this difference may also 
reflect any impact on credit demand and supply of the stronger macroeconomic policy response 
in the recent episode.  Nevertheless, the impacts of rate spread variables on the relative use of 
commercial paper were estimated in the presence of some controls for credit demand in both 
periods, and commercial paper volumes began rising during the summer of 2009.  In addition, 
some of the beneficial effects of the commercial paper funding facility may be hard to 
disentangle from complementary effects of other efforts to bolster liquidity in credit markets.  
With appropriate caveats, findings from both the Great Depression and the recent financial crisis 
suggest that new liquidity programs in the U.S. have, thus far, helped prevent the money markets 
from melting down by as fast as they did during the early 1930s.     34
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Appendix A: How This Paper’s Study of the Great Depression Relates to the 2007 Turmoil 
in Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Markets 
 
Compared to the current menu of corporate finance, financial markets were much less 
developed during the era examined. Partly to offset liquidity risk to investors, commercial paper 
issuers are forced by market forces to obtain formal back-up lines of bank credit to ensure timely 
payment, a practice which generally began in the 1970s.  
However, default risk remains an important aspect facing securities markets.  Ostensibly 
to address such concerns and to expand the availability of commercial paper, the asset-backed 
commercial paper (ABCP) market had grown rapidly and by yearend 2006, provided slightly 
more finance than more traditional commercial paper.  Many of the assets backing commercial 
paper were securities, including now-suspect subprime mortgage instruments.  As unanticipated 
increases in problem subprime mortgages mounted, the value of the assets backing this paper 
became highly suspect in the summer of 2007.  Ironically, it was asset-backed commercial paper 
that was hardest hit, probably because the paper had been viewed as safe based on the financial 
assets serving as collateral rather than the underlying strength of the issuing firm as in the case of 
traditional nonfinancial commercial paper.  Nevertheless, this event is consistent with this 
study’s findings from the 1930s.  For much of the recent crisis, little paper ineligible for the 
CPFF was issued, ostensibly because investors viewed such paper as lacking in liquidity or 
sufficient collateral backing.  In contrast, during the 1930s the liquidity of the BA market was 
sustained by the Fed’s conduct of money market operations and BAs were (and still are) backed 
by more concrete and re-sellable commodities and products. In this regard, the evidence 
presented in this study provides insights about how and why surges in liquidity and default risk 
that may result in flights to quality that sometimes affect the commercial paper market. Table 1: Monthly Cointegration Results 
            Unit Root Test Statistics Using 1924-39 Data: Augmented Dickey-Fuller Statistics (constant with trend) 
Variable   Level (lag)     5% Critical  1% Critical      First Difference (lag)-   5% Critical  1% Critical  Integration 
LBACP  -0.985635(3)      -3.435413  -4.010740      -6.218884
** (2)        -3.435413  -4.010740         1 
LCOTR   1.465370(4)      -3.435413  -4.010740      -9.850798
** (2)     -3.435413  -4.010740         1 
LATR    -1.250924 (4)      -3.435560  -4.011044      -8.815711
** (3)           -3.435560  -4.011044         1 
LBAATR  -2.019656 (13)    -3.436957  -4.013946      -3.149696
+ (12)           -3.436957  -4.013946         1? 
LCTDRAT  -2.453605 (13)    -3.436957  -4.010740      -2.976100 (10)     -3.436957  -4.013946         2 
LCDRAT  -2.702255 (9)      -3.436318  -4.012618      -2.745561
 (10)     -3.436634  -4.013274         2 
 
Vec #    Cointegrating Vector (monthly data: 1924:12-1939:12)              Trace Statistic (no vector)  MaxEigen (no vector)  
1  LBACPt  -  3.706096 LCOTR t
**  - 1.798746                             20.36427
**   19.24108
** 
     (-7.45)                                                                                      (other statistics imply one significant vector) 
      
2    LBACPt  -  3.416463 LCOTR t
**  - 1.958835  (Bank Holiday Dummy Present)                22.48272
**   19.62396
** 
      (-7.20)                                                                                         (other statistics imply one significant vector)  
 
3  LBACPt  -  4.040193 LCOTR t
** -  0.308124 LCTDRAT t  - 0.840934              49.07472
*   29.03159
 
      (-7.19)          (-0.51)               (other statistics could not reject at most 2 significant vectors) 
  
4    LBACPt  -  3.977967 LCOTR t
** -  0.258835 LCTDRAT t  - 0.999007 (with Bank Holiday)          37.54708
*   20.46756
 
      (-7.16)          (-0.42)               (trace statistics could not reject at most 2 significant vectors) 
 
5  LBACPt  -  3.769151 LCOTR t
**  - 0.289142BANKACT35 – 1.681512              20.36427
**   19.24108
** 
           (-7.01)              (-0.93)                                                                  (other statistics imply one significant vector)  
 
6  LBACPt  -  4.099829 LCOTR t
**  - 0.3684BANKACT35 – 1.476143 (with Bank Holiday)         25.89842    22.11003
* 
           (-7.33)              (-1.13)                                                            (other statistics imply one or no significant vector)  
                           data: 1924:12-1934:12                                ‘ 
7  LBACPt  -  4.155675 LCOTR t
**  - 1.345904                             16.58185
*   15.34367
* 
     (-7.28)                                                                                      (other statistics imply one significant vector) 
      
8    LBACPt  -  3.904907 LCOTR t
**  - 1.509059  (Bank Holiday Dummy Present)                18.56457
*   15.31146
* 
      (-6.97)                                                                                         (other statistics imply one significant vector)  
 
t-statistics in parentheses. 
*(
**) significant at the 5- (1-) percent level. Flipping the signs in the vectors yields the estimated equilibrium; 
vector 1 implies that equilibrium LBACPt =  3.706096 * LCOTR t
  + 1.798746. Significant vectors found using 1 lag. ADF test lags based on 
the AIC criterion.  ADF on second difference of LCTDRAT was 5.618684
** and that on LCDRAT was 10.24613
**.   40
Table 2: Montlhy Cointegration Results Using the A-Treasury Spread (LATR) 
             
 
Vec.    Cointegrating Vector (data: 1924:12-1939:12)                  Trace Statistic  MaxEigen 
#                                             (no vector)    (no vector) 
1  LBACPt  -  3.559119 LATR t
**  - 1.680696                             21.43845
**   20.23087
** 
     (-8.18)                                                                                      (other statistics imply one significant vector) 
      
2    LBACPt  -  3.314697 LATR t
**  - 1.829482  (Bank Holiday Dummy Present)                23.72093
**   20.70300
** 
      (-7.95)                                                                                         (other statistics imply one significant vector)  
 
3    LBACPt  -  4.063107 LATR t
** - 0.031889 LCTDRATt  - 6.454662                 34.89087
*   22.82765
* 
      (-7.88)  (-0.06)               (other statistics could not reject at most 2 significant vectors) 
  
4    LBACPt  -  3.969935 LATR t
** + 0.044550 LCTDRATt -1.542406    (with Bank Holiday)       39.28708
**  22.69815
* 
      (-7.85)  (0.07)               (other statistics could not reject at most 2 significant vectors) 
 
5    LBACPt  -  3.772371 LATR t
**  - 0.208187BANKACT35 – 1.491567              25.95849    22.24518
* 
           (-7.80)            (-0.72)                                                                  (other statistics found no significant vectors)  
 
6  LBACPt  -  3.479845 LATR t
**  - 0.144739BANKACT35 – 1.386432              28.58202    22.59858
*    
        (-7.50)           (-0.53)                                                                 (other statistics found no significant vectors)  
                           data: 1924:12-1934:12                                ‘ 
7  LBACPt  -  3.815608 LATR t
**  - 1.366526                             15.40299
*   14.19244
* 
     (-7.11)                                                                                      (other statistics imply one significant vector) 
      
8    LBACPt  -  3.561570 LATR t
**  - 1.545166  (Bank Holiday Dummy Present)                17.57511
*   14.42267
* 
      (-6.86)                                                                                         (other statistics imply one significant vector)  
 
t-statistics in parentheses. 
*(
**) significant at the 5- (1-) percent level. Trace and Maxeigen statistics were strongest using 1 lag when 
estimating the cointegrating vectors. Flipping the signs in the cointegrating vectors yields the estimated equilibrium; thus, vector 1 implies 
that equilibrium LBACPt =  3.559119 * LATR t
  + 1.680696.    41
Table 3: Monthly Models of the Change in the Ratio of Domestic Bankers Acceptances to Commercial Paper Outstanding 
(all models use the spread between investment grade corporate bond yields and the long-term U.S. Treasury yield) 
 
     Models Without Currency-Deposit or Bank Holiday Variables           Models With          Models With  
          1925:02-1939:12 Sample         1925:02-1934:12 Sample  LCTDRAT Shift Variable   Banking Act Dummy   
Variable  Model 1  Model 2  Model 7  Model 8  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6 
constant  -0.0002 -0.0002 0.0059   0.0032   -0.0010 -0.0022 -0.0015 -0.0037 
  (-0.04)   (-0.42)   (0.78)   (0.44)   (-0.17)   (-0.38)   (-0.27)   (-0.65) 
 









  (-3.58)   (-3.77)   (-2.80)   (-2.93)   (-2.70)   (-2.92)   (-3.63)   (-3.81)   
 
ΔLCOTR t-1  0.0049   -0.0195 -0.0034 -0.0304 -0.0143 -0.0143 0.0259   0.0024 











  (6.23)   (6.08)   (5.52)   (5.39)   (6.00)   (6.00)   (6.12)   (5.97) 
 
ΔLCTDRATt-1          0.5625
*  -0.198
        
          (2.47)   (-0.42)        
 
ΔBANKACT35t 
   
        








**    
  0.1812
**   
   0.1442
*   0.1893
** 




2   .260   .305   .267   .324   .273   .290   .308   .338 
VECLM(1) 7.53   4.30   5.99   3.01   20.07
*   18.06
*   21.51
*   16.59
+ 
VECLM(24)  4.00   3.30   3.58   5.28   12.66   14.06   7.78   7.41 
 
t-statistics in parentheses. 
*(
**) denotes significant at the 5- (1-) percent level. EC terms from same-numbered vectors in Table 1. 
Except for models 7 and 8, sample period is 1925:02-1939:12, using lagged first differences of data available over 1924:12-1939:12. 
   42
  
Table 4: Monthly Models of the Change in the Ratio of Domestic Bankers Acceptances to Commercial Paper Outstanding 
(all models use the spread between A-rated corporate bond yields and the long-term U.S. Treasury yield) 
 
       Models Without Currency-Deposit or Bank Holiday Variables          Models With           Models With 
          1925:02-1939:12 Sample         1925:02-1934:12 Sample LCTDRAT  Shift  Variable   Banking Act Dummy  
Variable  Model 1  Model 2  Model 7  Model 8  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6 
constant  -0.0003 -0.0024 0.0058   0.0031   -0.0010 0.0023   -0.0016 -0.0038 
  (-0.04)   (-0.42)   (0.77)   (0.42)   (-0.17)   (0.39)   (-0.27)   (-0.66) 
 









  (-3.55)   (-3.76)   (-2.63)   (-2.84)   (-2.67)   (-3.04)   (-3.62)   (-3.85)   
 
ΔLATR t-1  0.0006   -0.0226 0.0031   -0.0240 -0.0193 -0.0204 0.0184   -0.0046 











  (6.25)   (6.10)   (5.58)   (5.45)   (5.96)   (5.94)   (6.15)   (6.00) 
 
ΔLCTDRATt-1          0.5562
*  0.2308
       
          (2.43)   (0.87)          
 
ΔBANKACT35t 
   
        








**    
  0.1853
**   
   0.1530
*   0.1928
** 




2   .259   .305   .261   .321   .272   .293   .291   .339 
VECLM(1) 6.86   4.82   5.84   3.65   19.27
*   16.13
+   20.76
*   24.13
* 
VECLM(24)  4.98   4.29   4.23   6.22   13.66   18.05
*   7.51   7.08 
 
t-statistics in parentheses. 
*(
**) denotes significant at the 5- (1-) percent level. EC terms from same-numbered vectors in Table 2. 
Except for models 7 and 8, sample period is 1925:02-1939:12, using lagged first differences of data available over 1924:12-1939:12. 
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Table 5: Quarterly Cointegration Results for the Ratio of Domestic Bankers Acceptances to Commercial Paper 
            Unit Root Test Statistics Using 1925-39 Data: Augmented Dickey-Fuller Statistics (constant with trend) 
Variable   Level (lag)     5% Critical  1% Critical      First Difference (lag)-   5% Critical  1% Critical  Integration 
LBACP  -1.362154 (3)      -3.492149  -4.130526      -5.398530
** (1)        -3.490662  -4.127338         1 
LCOTR   -1.564508 (0)      -3.487845  -4.121303      -8.786970
** (0)     -3.489228  -4.124265         1 
LATR    -1.500086 (0)      -3.487845  -4.121303      -8.838056
** (0)           -3.489228  -4.124265         1 
LBAATR  -2.165331 (6)      -3.496960  -4.140858      -1.694477
 (10)           -3.506374  -4.161144         2 
LCTDRAT  -2.983856 (5)      -3.495295  -4.137279      -2.710456 (6)     -3.498692  -4.144584         2 
LCDRAT  -2.609681 (3)      -3.492149  -4.130526      -2.947708
 (1)     -3.490662  -4.127338         2             
 
Vec #    Cointegrating Vector (monthly data: 1924:12-1939:12)              Trace Statistic (no vector)  MaxEigen (no vector)  
1  LBACPt  -  3.963979 LCOTR t
**  - 2.942468                             19.40161
*   16.91762
* 
     (-7.99)                                                                                      (other statistics imply one significant vector) 
      
2    LBACPt  -  4.003536 LCOTR t
**  - 2.964642  (with banking & stock crash variables)               19.82609
*   17.23445
* 
      (-7.92)                                                                                              (other statistics imply one significant vector)  
 
3    LBACPt  -  3.493070 LCOTR t
** + 1.285545 LCTDRATt
+  - 5.327311                 32.15650
*   21.14548
* 
      (-6.22)     (1.88)                                                                  (other statistics imply one significant vector)  
  
4    LBACPt  -  3.565933 LCOTR t
** + 1.733188 LCTDRATt
*-6.301709 (banking & stock variables)    39.41407
**   27.40861
** 
      (-6.54)       (2.60)                     (other statistics imply one significant vector)  
 
5  LBACPt  -  3.817962 LATR t
**  - 3.075199                             19.74074
*   17.05792
* 
     (-8.67)                                                                                      (other statistics imply one significant vector) 
      
6    LBACPt  -  3.880861 LATR t
**  - 3.113993  (with banking & stock crash variables)               19.59003
*   16.87102
** 
      (-8.45)                                                                                              (other statistics imply one significant vector)  
 
7    LBACPt  -  3.503198 LATR t
** + 1.267785 LCDRATt
+  - 5.493776                 32.46190
**   20.84089
 
      (-6.53)  (1.96)               (trace statistics could not reject at most 2 significant vectors) 
  
8    LBACPt  -  3.538532 LATR t
** + 1.805353 LCDRATt
** -6.636519 (banking & stock variables)      39.08555
**   26.43566
** 
        (-6.53)    (2.76)                       (other statistics imply one significant vector)  
 
t-statistics in parentheses. 
*(
**) significant at the 5- (1-) percent level. Trace and MaxEigen statistics were strongest when estimating the 
cointegrating vectors using 2 lags for vectors 1, 2, 5, and 6 and using 4 lags for vectors 3, 4, 7, and 8. Flipping the signs in the cointegrating 
vectors yields the estimated equilibrium.   44
Table 6: Quarterly Models of the Change in the Ratio of Bankers Acceptances to Commercial Paper (Sample: 1925:q1-39:q4) 
      SPREAD=Investment Grade Corporate-Treasury Yield Spread   SPREAD=A-Rated Corporate-Treasury Yield Spread  
Variable  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6  Model 7  Model 8 
constant  0.0047   0.0049   -0.0070  -0.0082  0.0046   0.0046   -0.0052  -0.0075 
  (0.20)   (0.26)   (-0.33)   (-0.82)   (0.20)   (0.24)   (-0.24)   (-0.42) 
 









  (-3.58)   (-2.59)   (-3.63)   (-4.44)   (-2.62)   (-2.35)   (-3.56)   (-4.35)   
 
ΔLSPREAD t-1  0.2074   -0.3279 -0.1219 -0.0257 0.2125
* 0.3541
+ -0.1313 -0.0181 
  (0.83)   (-1.58)   (-0.48)   (-1.23)   (2.52)   (1.65)   (-0.50)   (-0.08) 
 
ΔLSPREAD t-2  -0.1151 0.0154   -0.3458 -0.2058 -0.0563 0.0594   -0.3011 -0.1879 




**  0.1518 
  0.0797 
  0.3331
**  0.3358
**  0.1635 
  0.0899
 











  (-1.89)   (-1.62)   (-1.99)   (-1.66)   (-1.90)   (-1.67)   (-1.95)   (-1.62) 
 
ΔLCTDRATt-1      1.8972
** 1.3862
*    
   
   1.9107
**   1.3508
* 
      (3.11)   (2.46)          (3.06)     (2.36) 
BACTDDt 
   
  -0.3277
**      -0.3045
**    -0.3176
**     -0.2922
** 




**    
  0.3627
*   
   0.3796
**     0.4003
* 
    (3.41)        (2.18)        (3.56)        (2.32) 
 
STCRASHDD    0.2351
*   0.2412
*   0.2257
*   0.2294
* 
_     (2.25)        (2.57)        (2.15)        (2.44) 
R
2   .269   .501   .437   .622   .259   .492   .427   .615 
VECLM(1) 0.37   2.08   7.27   7.25   0.55   2.25   9.00   8.24 
VECLM(12)  5.64   7.21   8.51   7.55   4.84   4.82   7.86   4.59 
t-statistics in parentheses. 
*(
**) denotes significant at the 5- (1-) percent level. EC terms from same-numbered vectors in Table 5. 
Except for models 7 and 8, sample period is 1925:02-1939:12, using lagged first differences of data available over 1924:12-1939:12. Some 
statistically insignificant lag first difference coefficients in models 3, 4, 7, and 8 are not reported to conserve space.   45
Table 7: Quarterly Cointegration Results for the Log Level of Real Domestic Bankers Acceptances 
            Unit Root Test Statistics Using 1925-39 Data: Augmented Dickey-Fuller Statistics (constant with trend) 
Variable   Level (lag)     5% Critical  1% Critical      First Difference (lag)-   5% Critical  1% Critical  Integration 
LBAREAL  -0.857813 (0)      -3.487845  -4.121303      -6.320672
** (0)        -3.489228  -4.124265         1 
LBUSACT  -1.188095 (4)      -3.493692  -4.133838      -4.066359
* (3)        -3.493692  -4.133838         1 
  
Vec #    Cointegrating Vector (monthly data: 1924:12-1939:12)              Trace Statistic (no vector)  MaxEigen (no vector)  
 
1  LBALEVt  -  2.633622 LCOTR t
** - 1.538562 LBUSACT t
**  + 2.592309             34.96885
*   21.55812
* 
     (-8.35)     (-3.94)                                                                      (other statistics imply one significant vector) 
      
2    LBALEVt  - 2.940340 LCOTR t
** - 1.756124 LBUSACT t
**  + 3.736286              32.39268
*   21.49691
* 
          (-8.17)                  (-4.02)                    (banking act variable included, other statistics imply one significant vector)  
 
3    LBALEVt  - 2.361469 LCOTR t
** - 2.027957 LBUSACT t
**  + 4.609104                 43.62225
**  28.92987
** 
      (-6.16)     (-4.35)          (banking & stock variables included, other statistics imply one significant vector)  
  
4    LBALEVt -  3.158840 LCOTR t
** - 1.626813 LBUSACTt
+ + 4.006494 LCDRATt
* + 8.415600         64.95828
**  38.10868
** 
      (-3.68)    (-1.79)            (2.19)  (banking & stock variables included, statistics imply 1 sign. vector)   
 
5  LBALEVt  - 2.788043 LATR t
** -  1.677544 LBUSACT t
**  + 3.451023              34.67038
*   21.43028
* 
       (-9.45)                     (-4.40)                                                                      (other statistics imply one significant vector) 
      
6    LBALEVt  - 2.952517 LATR t
** -  1.869143 LBUSACT t
**  + 4.408328              33.92810
*   23.26891
* 
          (-9.08)              (-4.54)                    (banking act variable included, other statistics imply one significant vector)   
 
7    LBALEVt  - 2.592176 LATR t
** -  2.103709 LBUSACT t
**  + 5.219554                 41.77930
**  27.09670
** 
      (-7.39)                       (-4.71)          (banking & stock variables included, other statistics imply one significant vector)   
  
8    LBALEVt  - 3.641904 LATR t
** - 1.172154 LBUSACTt
+ + 3.935691 LCDRATt
** + 6.797444          61.49279
**  36.11129
** 
      (-5.69)            (-1.75)             (2.80)  (banking & stock variables included, statistics imply 1 sign. vector)   
 
t-statistics in parentheses. 
*(
**) significant at the 5- (1-) percent level. Trace and MaxEigen statistics were strongest when estimating the 
cointegrating vectors using 4 lags for vectors 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, and 8; while using 5 lags for vectors 1 and 5. Flipping the signs in the 
cointegrating vectors yields the estimated equilibrium.   46
Table 8: Quarterly Models of the Change in the Real Level of Bankers Acceptances (Sample: 1925:q1-39:q4) 
 
         Using Investment Grade Corporate-Treasury Yield Spread      Using A-Rated Corporate-Treasury Yield Spread  
Variable  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6  Model 7  Model 8 
constant  -0.0211 -0.0159 -0.0318
+ -0.0318
* 0.0046    -0.0159  -0.0304
+ -0.0321
* 
  (-0.89)   (-0.87)   (-1.93)   (-3.51)   (0.20)   (-0.87)   (-1.85)   (-2.07) 
 









  (-2.98)   (-3.34)   (-4.00)   (-4.50)   (-2.98)   (-3.38)   (-3.56)   (-4.36)   
 
ΔLSPREAD t-1-0.6126
+ -0.4217  -0.4123
+ -0.0257  06444
+   -0.4761
+ -0.1313  -0.7123
** 




*  0.1554 
  0.0522 
  0.2797
**  0.2696
*  0.1635 
  0.0994
 






   -0.9478
* 1.9107
**   -1.1101
** 
  (-1.40)   (-2.22)   (-2.77)   (3.20)     (-1.51) (-2.40)   (3.06)     (-3.20) 
 
ΔLCDRATt-1           -0.0964
     
   
          0.1222 
           (-0.21)                 (0.25) 
 
BACTDDt 
   
  -0.4307
**   -0.4101
** -0.4353




      (-4.23) (-4.62)      (-5.09)     (-4.09)   (-4.40)   (-4.88) 
  
BANKHOLIDt 
   
  0.4003
**  0.6571
**   




           (2.71)     (3.66)             (2.35)   (3.21) 
 
STCRASH       
  0.3130
**  0.3004




         (2.65)   (2.67)                (2.54)   (2.65) 
_ 
R
2   .070   .373   .525   .585   .074   .369   .517   .573 
VECLM(1)  12.72   5.92   3.92   13.14   10.48   6.98   5.94   9.90 
VECLM(12) 17.61
*   25.57
**   13.16   15.50   13.83   17.98
*   8.96   12.51 
 
t-statistics in parentheses. 
*(
**) denotes significant at the 5- (1-) percent level. EC terms from same-numbered vectors in Table 7. 
t-2 through t-4 lagged first difference coefficients are not reported to conserve space.   47
 
Table 9: Monthly Models of the Change in the Commercial Paper-Bank Loan Mix 
(All sample periods start in 2001:02) 
 
                    Using Level Inventory Diffusion Index              Using 3-Month Difference Inventory Diffusion Index 
End of  
Sample: 2008:10 2009:09 2009:  09  2009:  09  2008:  10  2009:09 2009:09 2009:09 
 
Variable Model  1 Model  2 Model  3 Model  4 Model  5 Model  6 Model  7 Model  8 
 
constant  -0.5457 -3.4478 -3.8637
+ -2.9576
+  -0.0151 -0.0322 -0.0591 -0.0405 
  (-0.30)   (-1.60)   (-1.95)   (-1.81)   (-0.37)   (-0.50)   (-1.00)   (-0.85) 
 
Δrspreadt-1 -0.7216
* 0.1158    -1.0844
* -0.9029
* -0.7322
* 0.2067    -1.0715
* -0.8370
*  
  (-2.14)   (0.32)   (-2.31)   (-2.34)   (-2.18)   (0.57)   (-2.28)   (-2.20)   
 
Δrspreadt-2  0.1635   0.2318   -0.1052  -0.0744  0.1619   0.2790   -0.0228  -0.0364   











  (-2.59)   (-3.95)   (-3.94)   (-5.03)   (-2.63)   (-3.46)   (-3.42)   (-4.32)   
 
(FP*Δrspread)t-1     1.5088
** 2.1647
**         1.6409
** 2.2771
** 
      (2.70)   (4.62)       (2.97)   (5.02) 
 
(FP*Δrspread)t-2     0.6740   0.2372          0.6124   0.2026 
      (1.00)   (0.43)       (0.92)   (0.38) 
 
(FP*Δrspread)t-3     1.1118
* 0.5622          0.9622
+ 0.4118 
      (2.03)   (1.23)       (1.77)   (0.93) 
 
LINVt     0.1386




         (0.29)   (1.58)   (1.92)   (1.78)    
 
Δ3LINV t              
  -0.1589




        (-0.23)   (1.57)   (1.71)   (2.62) 


































    (-1.95)    (-1.74)   (-0.70)   (-1.79)   (-1.96)    (-1.56)   (-0.57)   (-2.08) 
  
ΔTALF t- 1         2.5503
**
        2.6751
** 
        (6.69)         (7.16) 
 
F-Test  all            8.82
**   12.83
**       8.61
**   13.60
**  
three lags of 




2(corrected)  .591   .354   .482   .648   .590   .354   .478   .661 
S.E.   0.3882   0.6561   0.5875   0.4819   0.3882   0.6529   0.5868   0.4728 
LM(2)     0.37
      1.45      1.31      0.00      0.27      1.16      1.69      2.11 
Q(4)      3.76    14.08
*   17.56
**     5.33      3.80    12.43
*   16.65
**     3.99 
Q(12)     14.54   18.65
+   21.26
*       9.11   14.85   16.38   20.05
+     8.47 
 
 
Δrspread denotes change in rate spread listed at top of column. t-statistics in parentheses. 
*(
**,+) significant at the 5- (1-, 10-) percent level.    49
Appendix Table A1: Quarterly One-Stage Models, Change in the Relative Use of Bankers Acceptances (Sample: 1925:q1-39:q4) 
 
         Using Investment Grade Corporate-Treasury Yield Spread      Using A-Rated Corporate-Treasury Yield Spread  
 
Variable    Model 1  Model 2  Model 3      Model 4  Model 5  Model 6 
Constant   -0.3533
** -0.2103  -0.3020




   (-2.78)   (-1.60)   (-2.86)     (-2.81)   (-1.87)   (-2.76)   
 
LBALEVt-1   -0.1441
** -0.1139
* -0.1232




   (-2.89)   (-2.52)   (-2.98)     (-2.94)   (-2.72)   (-2.90)    
 
LSPREADt-1   0.4537
**  0.2977
+  0.3889




   (2.72)   (1.79)   (2.82)     (2.75)   (2.04)   (2.70)    
 
ΔLSPREAD t-1   0.2306   0.3029   0.2991     0.2044   0.2777   0.2956
 
   (1.01)   (1.43)   (1.58)     (0.87)   (1.30)   (1.51)   
 
ΔLBALEVt-1   0.3275
*  0.2985
*  0.3441




   (1.82)   (2.57)   (3.26)     (2.67)   (2.55)   (3.31)    
 
ΔLBALEVt-2   -0.2126
+ -0.2502
*  -0.1463   -0.2144
+ -0.2546
*   -0.1502   
   (-1.71)   (-2.15)   (-1.41)     (-1.72)     (-2.20) (-1.44)    
 
BACTDDt  
   
  -0.1111
**   -0.3232
**      -0.1083
* -0.3120
**  
       (-2.14) (-3.18)          (-2.11)   (-3.05)    
  
BANKHOLIDt 
    
  0.3575
**       
    
  0.3718
** 
            (3.44)              (3.56) 
 
STCRASH       
  0.2336
*     
   0.2236
* 
          (2.27)         (2.16) 
_ 
R
2        .282      .307      .515         .278      .318    .508 
LM(1)       0.03      0.02      1.38          0.05      0.32    1.38     
LM(2)       0.71      0.37      2.38          1.00      1.15    2.39     
Q(12)    14.88
   14.89   13.16     16.73   16.90   14.90    
t-statistics in parentheses. 
*(
**) denotes significant at the 5- (1-) percent level. 
 